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Major-General Roger Rowley and 
the Failure of Military Reform, 
1958-1969 
P E T E R  K A S U R A K
Abstract : Many consider the pre-Unification Canadian Army to have 
achieved the apogee of professionalism, but long-term progress did not 
result. Major-General Roger Rowley led three major reforms of the 
Canadian Army and the Canadian Forces during the 1958-1969 period: 
the reform of the Canadian Army Staff College, the restructuring of the 
Army through the Army Tactics and Organization Board and the reform 
of the military profession and officer development through the Officer 
Development Board. The failure of Rowley’s initiatives reveals the limits 
of knowledge-based professionalism, collegial decision making and the 
development of a national strategic perspective in the armed forces of the 
1960s and 1970s.
RefoRm” is not a subject subject that occurs to many historians when thinking of the early Cold War Canadian Army. According 
to the consensus view of Canadian historians, the 1945 to 1968 
period was the height of Army professionalism. Jack Granatstein 
in fact titles his chapter on this period in Canada’s Army “The 
Professional Army.” He says it was “the golden age of Canadian 
military professionalism” and praises its efficiency, the creation of 
a “true General Staff” and Army Headquarters as a “centre for 
policy and planning.” In The Administration of Defence Policy in 
Canada, Douglas Bland opposes the golden “Command Era” of 1946 
to 1964 with the rather leaden “Management Era” which followed. 
John A. English calls the army that emerged from the Second World 
© Canadian Military History 2020
“
1
Kasurak: Rowley and the Failure of Military Reform
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2020
2 Rowley and the Failure of Military Reform
War “the best little army in the world” and the immediate post-war 
period “the flowering of professionalism.”1
There is substantial evidence to support this point of view. The 
Army had established the Canadian Army Staff College in 1946 and 
was moving away from its dependence on the British Army. It was 
meeting the emerging challenge of tactical nuclear war by expanding 
its use of operations research and through the establishment of a 
combat development function.2 Yet all was not well. Internally, 
elements of the Canadian Army’s British inheritance created 
challenges to modernisation. Externally, the disruption of Paul 
Hellyer’s integration and unification of armed services redirected or 
cancelled single service reforms. Progressives would fail to create an 
army based on professional knowledge and one which would be a 
strong contributor to the development of national strategy.
Internal difficulties had their origin in the British Army heritage 
of the Canadian Army. While part of an imperial army it had never 
had to develop policy or doctrine on its own and its first attempts 
in the post-war period were far from successful. Initial efforts to 
develop national doctrine were impaired by the British Army culture 
shared by the Canadian Army. The British Army itself had failed 
to implement a successful doctrine for mechanised war and relied on 
commanders of divisions and higher formations to muddle through 
based on their own innate genius and intuition. This was combined 
with authoritarian leadership that stripped junior levels of initiative.3 
Battlefield success imprinted these traits on the post-war Canadian 
Army. The 1955-56 Exercise Gold Rush exemplified this leadership 
1  J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 341-42; Douglas Bland, The Administration of 
Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985 (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987), 
1-12; and John A. English, Lament for an Army: The Decline of Canadian Military 
Professionalism (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 46-50.
2  Howard G. Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl: Canada’s Army and Staff 
Education (1946-1995)” (Ph.D. dissertation, Queen’s University, 2010); Andrew B. 
Godefroy, In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War 
Army (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014); and Sean M. Maloney, An Identifiable Cult: The 
Evolution of Combat Development in the Canadian Army, 1946-1965, Directorate of 
Land Strategic Concepts Report 9905 (Kingston: Department of National Defence, 
1999).
3  David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against 
Germany, 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21-22, 201, 278-80; 
and David French, “Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919-1932” The 
Historical Journal 44, 2 (2001): 514-15.
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style. Gold Rush was Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Guy Simonds’ 
attempt to develop doctrine for tactical nuclear war. Determined 
that supply up to division be done by “flying truck” STOL aircraft, 
Simonds overruled both his scientific advisor and study director when 
they raised practical, technological difficulties. He simply dictated the 
tactical concept to the team. In true British Army fashion, the next 
CGS, Howard Graham, ditched Gold Rush and replaced it with his 
own incompatible concept. A similar story of senior officer diktat and 
staff advice ignored can be seen in the Army’s attempt to develop an 
armoured personnel carrier, the Bobcat. Unable to pass a technical 
evaluation and costing twice as much as the American M113, it was 
eventually abandoned.4
Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley suggest that the simplicity of 
Cold War alliance strategy and routinisation of defence tasks was 
debilitating. In their opinion it was the conventional North American 
Treaty Organization (NATO) warfighting framework that “nurtured 
a system that relied on the traditional military concept that leadership 
is a top-down hierarchical action that depends on unit command 
and staff appointments, specifically experience, as the mechanism 
to prepare individuals for higher command at the strategic level.” 
Within this model, education was not important and a hierarchical 
“industrial age” leadership culture with a directive and authoritarian 
approach predominated.5 Douglas Bland, though viewing what he 
calls “the Command Era” more favourably, notes that it was marked 
by “command authority, military concepts for decision-making and 
administration, … and a reliance on subjectivity based on experience.”6
Equally regressive was the inherited British Army preference for 
officership based on character rather than professional knowledge. 
In the early post-war period General Charles Foulkes, the chairman 
of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, advocated for a degreed officer 
corps, recruiting officers from civilian universities and then sending 
4  Peter Kasurak, A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 29-34; and Peter Kasurak, Canada’s Mechanized 
Infantry: The Evolution of a Combat Arm, 1920-2012 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2020), 
87-109. Godefroy excuses Simonds leadership style by saying that “institutional 
inertia within the army was often strong” and that it took strong means to “overcome 
these traditional obstacles” (Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 127).
5  Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian 
Armed Forces (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015), 27-29.
6  Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 5.
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them to the Royal Military College (RMC) for military-specific 
education and training. However, as the military college system was 
re-established, CGS Guy Simonds did not want to exclude “otherwise 
suitable” candidates for want of an education and campaigned until 
his retirement for entry into RMC from junior matriculation (Grade 
10), with cadets graduating with only one year of university studies. 
Other senior Canadian Army officers evidenced nostalgia for a British 
class system that likely never existed in the form they imagined it. 
Granatstein comments that the Canadian Army officer corps was 
“resolutely ill-educated” with fewer than one-third having degrees 
in the 1960s.7 This traditional—even anachronistic—orientation of 
the Army would have two important impacts. It would distance the 
Army from a country which was hard at the task of educating and 
professionalising itself. It would also leave its own talent base thinner 
and less able to provide analysis and policy advice.
Externally, the post-war structure of the Canadian Army was 
disrupted by Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer’s reorganisation 
of the armed services; first by integrating the headquarters and 
support services and then by total unification into a single Canadian 
Armed Forces. The 1964 to 1972 period was one of constant 
reorganisation and attempts to extract savings by combining systems 
and organisations. The instability of the unification period would be 
a key factor in the failure of Major-General Roger Rowley’s projects.8
At the end of the 1950s the current field force was performing 
well, but the culture of the Canadian Army posed problems to those 
trying to plan and implement a future force. The immediate problem 
facing Rowley and the senior Army staff was how to remodel the 
Canadian Army to address the challenges of the nuclear battlefield 
while simultaneously building the capacity of the officer corps to 
design and manage a modern force. 
Roger Rowley (1914-2007) would seem, at first glance, to have 
been an unlikely reformer. The son of the president of E.B. Eddy, 
the Ottawa match and paper manufacturer, he was raised by his 
mother and her sister due to the early death of his father. His aunt 
had married Sir Francis Macnaughten, 8th Baronet, and they took 
7  Kasurak, A National Force, 48-49; and Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 317.
8  Vernon J. Kronenberg, All Together Now: the Organization of the Department of 
National Defence in Canada, 1964-1972 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1973), 100-18.
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Roger and his elder brother John under their wing and taught them 
to shoot, cast a fly and be gentlemen. He had a London tailor, shirt 
maker, bootmaker and hatter. After education at Ottawa’s Ashbury 
College and Dalhousie University, Rowley became a bond trader and 
was commissioned as a militia officer in the Cameron Highlanders of 
Ottawa in 1933. During the war he rose rapidly and was promoted 
to acting lieutenant-colonel in 1943 and appointed commander of 5 
Battle Wing, Canadian Training School in Great Britain. He reverted 
Major-General Roger Rowley. [Library and Archives Canada ZK-1958-2 ]
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to major as the second in command of the Cameron Highlanders 
and was promoted to lieutenant-colonel commanding the Stormont, 
Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders just prior to the Scheldt campaign. 
He was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for the capture of 
Boulogne. Post-war, Rowley attended both the Canadian and British 
Army staff colleges and the Imperial Defence College. He served in 
a number of staff appointments in Army Headquarters, including 
director of military operations and plans, director of infantry and 
director of military training. From 1954 to 1957, Rowley commanded 
the 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in Europe.9
One might have expected that Rowley would have followed the 
traditional side of Canadian Army culture as it existed from the pre-
war period right into the 1990s—Anglophilic, believing in leadership 
based on personal qualities rather than training and education 
and favouring hierarchical and rank-driven organisation based on 
regimental loyalties. Yet, while Rowley was no rebel and was somewhat 
of an organisation man, he did not conform to the traditional culture 
in many important respects. He valued training and education highly, 
worked by collaboration if not consensus, placed efficiency ahead of 
tradition and supported a Canadian national army.
Rowley was at the centre of three major initiatives to modernise the 
Army and the Canadian Forces: the redesign of the curriculum of the 
Canadian Army Staff College, the organisational and tactical renewal 
of the Army through the Army Tactics and Organization Board and 
the reconceptualisation of the Canadian military profession through 
the Officer Development Board. All three of these projects resulted 
in initiatives and recommendations which today would be applauded. 
At the time, they were all either overturned, shelved or rejected by 
Rowley’s contemporaries. Rowley had the misfortune to be tasked 
with major staff projects during a time of organisational change and 
instability. He also had the misfortune to be on the losing side of a 
debate between progressives and traditionalists on the character of 
officership. An examination of Rowley’s three failed projects leads to 
an understanding of the costs of service unification, the weaknesses 
9  Record of Service in the Canadian Army and the Canadian Armed Forces of 
Major-General Roger Rowley, DSO, ED, CD, Library and Archives Canada [LAC]; 
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of the senior officer corps and the internal sources of collapse which 
eventually became apparent in the Somalia Inquiry.
reforming the staff college
Rowley’s first appointment after commanding the brigade in Europe 
was as the commandant of Canadian Army Staff College (CASC) 
at Fort Frontenac in Kingston, Ontario. Rowley would begin his 
tenure finding the Army in a state of doctrinal confusion, due to the 
lack of a clear solution to nuclear war, and disinclined to raise its 
educational sights, as a result of the contested need to do so. 
In the late 1950s, the Canadian Army was just emerging from 
dependency on the British Army. It had begun its first steps in 
developing its own approach to war during the mid-1950s. Tactical 
nuclear weapons made the deficiencies of motorised, road-bound mass 
armies obvious. One Canadian officer commented after a field exercise 
that the infantry on the nuclear battlefield “seem[ed] to be there only 
to become casualties.”10 Initial attempts to develop nuclear tactics 
were less than successful due to the inherent difficulty of the problem, 
the lack of a combat development organisation and the Army’s top-
down command and decision structure which undercut sound staff 
analysis. Approved doctrine would not emerge until 1960.11
Rowley would also have to cope with the effects of the post-
Second World War Canadian Army’s collective decision to recruit 
officers based on character rather than intellectual capacity. This was 
compounded by the Korean War which generated a requirement for 
many junior officers which had been met by men “with a limited ability 
to absorb advanced education.” Rowley would find that only 19 per 
cent of applicants to the Staff College could pass the entrance exam 
and another 19 per cent were admitted based upon a “supplemental” 
pass which required additional work. The Army solved the problem 
of a low pass rate by discontinuing entrance exams on the grounds 
10  Major-General J.V. Allard to all GOC’s [General Officers Commanding] and 
Brigade Commanders, December 1958, Record Group 73/1327, National Defence 
Headquarters Directorate of History and Heritage Archives. Subsequent references 
to National Defence Headquarters Directorate of History and Heritage Archives will 
be as DHH.
11  Kasurak, A National Force, 55.
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that Staff College entrants had already been selected for promotion 
to major by examination.12
Rowley was not the first person to recognise that the Staff 
College curriculum required updating. His predecessor, Brigadier-
General Pat Bogert, had written in the 1957 edition of Snowy 
Owl, the Staff College journal, that nuclear warfare required major 
changes to what was being taught. Rowley quickly came to the same 
conclusion. He met with Lieutenant-General Graham, the chief of 
the general staff, in May 1958 and argued that students were not 
assimilating as much as they should nor gaining from their year at 
Fort Frontenac. Rowley wanted to weed the program and provide 
more time to practise the remaining subjects. Moreover, Rowley 
argued that because Canadian formations were assigned to NATO’s 
Northern Army Group, officers required the ability to function at the 
theatre level. Officers also needed additional training to deal with 
international staff appointments. Finally, Rowley wanted officers to 
understand the relationship between the government and the armed 
forces and the impact of science and technology on the future of 
war. To achieve all this, he believed the course should be extended 
from forty-five weeks to twenty months, including two months of 
leave or private study. The product of the private study would be 
a “major military paper” in the form of a thesis or a book review.13 
Rowley was able to get Graham to accept his proposal that the 
course be both lengthened and broadened. Graham in turn convinced 
George Pearkes, the minister of national defence, to approve Rowley’s 
proposal.14
By lengthening the course and adding strategic and arguably 
“academic” elements to it, Rowley was embracing the progressive 
12  Peter Kasurak, “Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: 
Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform,” Armed Forces & Society 37, 1 (January 
2011): 97-99.
13  Rowley to DGMT [Director General Military Training], Canadian Army Staff 
College – Policy, 10 June 1958, RG 76/157, DHH; and Howard Coombs, “Brigadier 
Roger Rowley and the Canadian Army Staff College, 1958-1962,” in The Report of 
the Officer Development Board: Maj-Gen Rowley and the Education of the Canadian 
Forces, ed. Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS Press 
of Wilfrid Laurier University, 2010), xxviii.
14  Coombs, “Brigadier Roger Rowley,” xxxivn11.  Coombs notes that Graham made 
the decision to lengthen the course, but Rowley’s 10 June 1958 memo to DGMT 
makes it clear that he had made the original proposal in discussions with Graham 
and the director of military training in May of that year.  
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school of thought—those that believed officership should be based 
on expertise. Moreover, while the mandate of the Staff College was 
to prepare officers for all branches of the staff “in peace and in 
war,” the actual content of the curriculum had fallen short of these 
aspirations.15 Rowley was insisting that it address its mandate by 
including civil-military relations, scientific and technical developments 
and international affairs as well as battlefield tactics. 
Even tactics were a considerable problem. As the army did not 
have a doctrinal manual of its own, the Staff College used a body of 
material known as “Canadian Army Staff College Future Doctrine” 
which was based on the knowledge and experience of College staff. 
When the first army doctrine manual appeared in provisional form it 
did not include a divisional headquarters, even though the Canadian 
commitment to NATO was to field a division. Rather, it defined the 
corps as the basic tactical unit and required the corps headquarters 
to manage brigade groups directly.16 The final document, CAMT1-8, 
The Infantry Brigade Group in Battle, published in 1960, at least 
acknowledged the possibility of divisional headquarters.17 Rowley 
found that even with this improvement, CAMT1-8 was inadequate 
for teaching purposes. Unlike the Staff College doctrine, the official 
manual was based on existing equipment and did not provide for 
the improvements in mobility and firepower that were planned for 
the 1964-65 future. In his opinion, it was vital that the Staff College 
curriculum recognise the increased tactical use of air transport, 
the inclusion of surface-to-surface missile nuclear fires, surface-to-
air missiles within the brigade group, tracked carriers for all units 
and the quantities and types of communication equipment that were 
actually in production. Major-General Jean Allard, the vice chief of 
the general staff, agreed with most of Rowley’s recommendations and 
thought that students coming off the 1961-63 course be prepared to 
deal with the armoured personnel carrier-mounted army slated to 
arrive in 1963. He instructed Rowley to carry on with the current 
brigade headquarters until the new logistics concept was in place. He 
did not foresee surface-to-air missile batteries at the brigade level, but 
15  As quoted in Coombs, “Brigadier Roger Rowley,” xxxi. Italics added by Coombs. 
16  Planning 1961-63 Staff Course, Prepared by Commandant CASC [Canadian Army 
Staff College], 21 September 1960, RG 76/157, DHH.
17  CAMT 1-8, The Infantry Brigade Group in Battle, Part 1 – Tactics, 1960, 55, 
RG 81/344, DHH.
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rather at corps. Nevertheless, he thought their employment should be 
part of the curriculum.18 
Rowley had succeeded in overhauling the Staff College curriculum 
and keeping pace with equipment changes, but his hopes that 
students would become scholars appear to have failed. There was 
only one paper published in Snowy Owl on national strategy and 
student cartoons in the Staff College journal gently derided the self-
study period, suggesting that it was mainly used to catch up on the 
crush of work in the main program or in recovering from it.19 There 
seemed to be no ground swell of enthusiasm from junior ranks for 
strategic thought nor apparently much support from the top. As for 
teaching doctrine that was future-oriented, Rowley’s initiative barely 
lasted long enough for his chair to cool. His successor, Brigadier D.C. 
Cameron, complained that only 23 per cent of the curriculum was 
based on current doctrine and that “consideration must be given to 
bringing the Canadian Army Staff College back into step with the 
rest of the Canadian Army.” Cameron preferred to teach current 
doctrine and have students discuss the impact of future weapons. 
He also suggested that the course could be reduced in length.20 The 
course was eventually reduced to one year in 1965 as part of an 
overall effort to unify all staff training in the Canadian Forces. As a 
result, the CASC became a junior staff course to mesh with the new 
unified Canadian Forces College. 
the army tactics and organization board (atob)
In September 1961, the government announced an increase of 11,571 
personnel in the authorised strength of the Army to bring the 
brigade in Europe up to its war establishment strength, provide for 
reinforcements, bring field force units in Canada to war establishment 
18  Brig. [Brigadier] R. Rowley, Commandant CASC to MGen. [Major-General] 
J.V. Allard, VCGS [Vice Chief of the General Staff], demi-official letter, 26 
September 1960, RG 76/157, DHH; and Minutes of a Meeting Between VCGS 
and Comdt CASC, Planning of 1961-63 Staff Course – General, 27 October 1960, 
RG 76/157, DHH.
19  Coombs, “Brigadier Roger Rowley” xxxi. See Snowy Owl 2, 3 (1963-1965): 114 
as an example.
20  Brig. D.C. Cameron, Cmdt CASC to VCGS, Tactical Doctrine, 1963-65 Course, 
25 April 1962, RG 76/157, DHH.
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and form a divisional headquarters and signals unit. The divisional 
headquarters was required so that Canada could meet its obligations 
under NATO’s 1957 directive MC70, which called on the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe to prepare a response to any type of 
incursion, possibly without the use of nuclear weapons. MC70 also 
mandated integrating nuclear delivery systems, including artillery 
and surface-to-surface missiles, into the Shield forces. Canada was 
obligated to put the balance of 1 Canadian Infantry Division in 
Europe by “M-day plus movement time,” that is, immediately.21
The primary role of divisional headquarters was to command 
the division in war. Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Walsh, the CGS, 
intended to mobilise the headquarters two to three months of the 
year so that its staff would be trained in the battle role. When 
not training for war, the headquarters would plan operations and 
training.22 Walsh was not completely happy with the analysis of a 
divisional organisation produced by his staff. It was a tour d’horizon 
of foreign practices and an inventory of problems but lacked solutions. 
He also faced pushback from the general officers commanding 
(GOCs) of the geographical commands who feared the new divisional 
headquarters would infringe on their authority. Walsh therefore 
changed the peacetime mandate of the division headquarters to 
that of a think tank and put Roger Rowley in charge to straighten 
things out. The Division Headquarters was to conduct studies to 
define tactical doctrine and to determine the method of command 
and control within the Division. Rowley was given authority to visit 
units and formations as he considered appropriate and reported 
directly to the CGS. He was jointly appointed as Commander, Army 
Tactics and Organization Board (ATOB) and Commander, Division 
Headquarters. The terms of reference were more or less the same 
as those of the Division Headquarters but added the responsibilities 
of providing input to war games and operations research studies 
and supervising user trials, field experiments and troop tests. The 
21  MGen. J.P.E. Bernatchez, VCGS to GOC’s and Branch Heads, Army Manpower, 
18 September 1961, Kardex 112.352 (D44), DHH; and Col. H.R.A. Parker, DMO&P 
to DSD, Role and Location of HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div, 18 October 1961, Kardex 112.352 
(D44), DHH.
22  Col. H.R.A. Parker, DMO&P to DSD, Role and Location of HQ 1 Cdn Inf 
Div, 18 October 1961, Kardex 112.352 (D44), DHH; and LGen. Walsh, CGS to 
Chairman Army Policy Co-ordination Committee, 20 November 1961, Kardex 
112.352 (D44), DHH.
11
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peacetime staff of the ATOB/1 Canadian Division Headquarters was 
fourteen officers and seventeen other ranks.23
Walsh demanded that the division fit within the Army’s 
budgetary and manpower constraints which limited it to 19,000 
personnel. According to Walsh, “[i]t will take some time to arrive 
at this optimum divisional organization. It must, however, be ready 
for examination at the next Tactical Symposium,” or in one year’s 
time. He directed Rowley to outline tentative organisations as soon 
as possible, trialed at unit stations during the winter and at field 
concentrations the next summer. One Canadian brigade would be 
trained in Russian tactics to act as an opposing force in the trials 
and the other brigades would employ Canadian doctrine. He provided 
Rowley with a list of the specific trials he wanted conducted.24
One wonders what Rowley thought of the task he had been given. 
His small staff had been activated on 1 September and now, six weeks 
later, he was given a job that the entire Army Headquarters had been 
unable to satisfactorily accomplish and ordered to do it within a year! 
Complicating his situation was the fact that the resources necessary 
to test out ideas were controlled by the five GOCs who had already 
indicated some jealousy of a Divisional Headquarters tasking their 
resources. An additional problem was having to develop doctrine for 
all levels of the organisation at the same time. For example, the 
Army had decided to acquire the SS11B anti-tank missile, but it 
was unclear whether it should (or even could) be mounted on the 
Centurion tank. Micro-level issues such as this would have to be 
decided at the same time as determining the overall architecture of 
the division. Financial constraints and the manpower cap were other 
complicating factors and potential option-killers. The prospects for 
success of Rowley’s project cannot have looked especially good.
23  Brig. W.S. Murdoch, DGCS [Deputy Chief of the General Staff] to VAG [Vice 
Adjutant General], VQMG [Vice Quartermaster General], DGPO [Director General 
Plans and Operations], DGMT [Director General Military Training], Role and 
Location – Headquarters 1 Canadian Infantry Division, 10 November 1961; Extract 
from Minutes of the 61/42 Meeting of the Army Policy Coordination Committee, 
24 November 1961; LGen. G. Walsh, CGS [Chief of the General Staff] to HQ Cmds 
[Headquarters of Commands] and Branch Heads, Headquarters 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division (HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div), Reactivation and Terms of Reference, 20 July 
1962; and LGen. G. Walsh, CGS, SD 1 Letter No.62, Army Tactics and Organization 
Board, Activation and Terms of Reference, all in Kardex 112.352 (D44), DHH.
24  Army Tactical Symposium –1962, [19 October 1962], RG 73/1314, DHH.
12
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Rowley’s approach to his task differed from what the Army had 
done before regarding organisation and doctrine studies and, sadly, 
what would follow his project. Rowley based his study on general 
principles which were explicitly stated and conducted his work by a 
data-driven approach which used staff research, operations research 
studies, field trials and experiments which were consolidated and 
filtered through a number of working groups. The top-down, ex 
cathedra management style that had been typical of Canadian Army 
doctrinal studies was ruled out by Walsh’s insistence on objective 
trials and Rowley’s own inclinations.
Rowley organised the required studies on a branch basis, plus 
several “functional studies” of fire support, anti-tank defence, 
reconnaissance and surveillance, the armour/infantry relationship, 
air defence, aviation and logistics. These “functional studies” targeted 
the most problematic issues of divisional organisation. Although using 
field trials and war games to the extent possible to develop and select 
options, Rowley believed that ultimately, organisation was a matter 
of professional judgement. Moreover, finding that the Army had 
already embarked on a re-equipment program without firm concepts 
and doctrine to back it up, he commented:
The first problem in studying organization is to find some rational basis 
for the work. It seems reasonable to say, at first, that organizations stem 
from tactical requirements. If we have a clearcut tactical doctrine, the 
organizations to suit it should flow from it. However, the erratic and 
almost haphazard development of organizations in the past lead one to 
believe that the reverse is just as likely to be true. Tactics often seem 
to develop from organizations and, of course, the equipment on hand. 
What does seem certain is that there is, and indeed should be, a definite 
connection between organizations and tactics.25
He therefore set out his own criteria and principles for organisation 
design. In brief, these were:
•	 Flexibility – The organisation should have sufficient parts 
to allow it to vary the proportion of strength allocated to 
25  Army Tactics and Organization Board, Final Report, ATOB 1963 Activities, n.d. 
[November 1963?], RG 87/165, DHH.  Hereafter cited as ATOB Final Report. 
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protection, striking or other roles without disrupting the internal 
organisation of its parts;
•	 Simplicity – There must not be so many parts in an organisation 
that the influence of the commander is too widely spread or on 
too many levels of command;
•	 Austerity – The organisation must not be burdened with such 
a variety of complex and sophisticated equipment that it will 
divert commanders from leadership and soldiers from the task of 
contacting and destroying the enemy;
•	 Durability – There must be a reserve to allow for some attrition 
without a significant loss of effectiveness; and
•	 Stability – The organisation should be designed so that 
interference with basic structure is exceptional.
According to Rowley, military operations consisted of two basic 
functions: hitting and guarding. Any organisation therefore required 
a minimum of two components as well as a third component as 
a reserve. Three component organisations were not flexible and 
required the commander to break down one or more units, whereas 
four component organisations allowed commanders to vary the 
strength of hitting, guarding and reserve without much organisational 
change. The problem was that if every level of the organisation had 
four components, the organisation would quickly become too large, 
unaffordable and unwieldy. 
The extensive trials program included studies of a three versus 
four company infantry battalion with two variants of the three 
company version, the anti-tank fire unit assessing the trade-offs 
between the SS11B and ENTAC missiles and the 106 mm recoilless 
rifle, artillery trials and an armoured regiment organisation study. 
The trials were combined with the results from operations research 
studies and war games conducted by the Canadian Army Operations 
Research Establishment (CAORE), the most notable of which were 
the Iron Crown series of war games which assessed the effectiveness 
of Canadian Army anti-tank equipment and doctrine.26 
26  Combat Development and Tactical Doctrine Committee, Minutes of the 62/3 
Meeting, 29 November 1962, RG 81/272, DHH; Combat Development and Tactical 
Doctrine Committee, Minutes of the 63/1 Meeting, 18 February 1963, RG 81/272, 
DHH; and ATOB Final Report, 311.
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The trials and studies were brought together by a series of 
coordination conferences chaired by Rowley. Participants included 
ATOB senior staff, Army Headquarters arms directors, the director 
general of military training and senior CAORE staff. Rowley chaired 
the conferences which generally began with a staff paper which was 
discussed by those present. Rowley would ask questions and let staff 
explain and debate the issues. He would occasionally interject to 
support or close off an issue and always summarised the consensus 
reached by the end of discussion, although he clearly made his own 
decisions and could overrule staff and advisors.27 
The character of the debate within ATOB encouraged by Rowley 
can best be seen in the discussion around the organisation of infantry 
and armour. Staff presented a paper advocating the integration of the 
two combat arms at the unit level, effectively creating a single combat 
arm. Some ATOB senior staff objected, calling this arrangement 
“inflexible” and “an uneconomic use of armour” while others argued 
that it was necessary because infantry could not move without 
armour support and it was unlikely that the infantry would ever be 
in a position where tanks could not be well employed. The director 
of armour did not see a great advantage, but ATOB staff claimed 
it would increase unit spirit and efficiency. In this case, Rowley 
summarised the discussion as agreeing that combining infantry and 
armour at the unit level would be beneficial. The debate then moved 
on to whether combining the arms at the unit level would improve 
training. In this case, both the director of armour and the director 
of infantry thought it would reduce competition between the two 
arms if everyone was in the same corps while others suggested that 
using the armour model of training would improve quality of the 
end product. Rowley asked the group their opinions regarding the 
interchangeability of soldiers between tanks and infantry and about 
logistic concerns and did not hear any strong objections. There was a 
strong consensus that mechanisation of infantry and the introduction 
of the armoured personnel carrier (APC) would mean that command 
would be exercised through radio communications as was already the 
case for the armour corps. While there was some concern that the 
span of control would become too great, Rowley did not think so and 
thought that experience during the Second World War showed that 
27  Army Tactics and Organization Board, Coordinating Conference No. 1, Digest of 
Presentation – Infantry/Tank Relationship, 19 March 1963, RG 80/234, DHH.
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radio command could work for infantry without difficulty. Overall, 
Rowley summarised the discussion as concluding that there was “a 
large body of opinion that favoured the ultimate amalgamation of 
these two fighting arms.”28
The ATOB Final Report did not recommend the creation of a 
single combat arm, even though it tilted heavily toward what Rowley 
called the “Panzer” model. Rowley argued that this model, which 
was tank-heavy but always integrated with infantry, was superior to 
the alternatives of using tanks for infantry support or tanks alone. 
Rowley was constrained in going further by terms of reference which 
required all recommendations to be implementable by 1965. He was 
also blocked by CGS Walsh and Vice-Chief Major-General J.P.E. 
Bernatchez’s unwillingness to even consider the question. Rowley 
proposed a study of the matter twice but was turned down each 
time as “not practical” and out of step with the development of Paul 
Hellyer’s White Paper. Walsh and Bernatchez had been more than 
willing to combine all the support arms into an integrated service 
battalion to meet operational needs, but apparently could not face 
reorganisation of the combat arms. They were also likely influenced by 
the knowledge that Rowley’s armour-heavy model was diametrically 
opposed to Hellyer’s objective of an air portable “mobile force.”29
Overall, the Final Report decisively rejected existing Canadian 
Army nuclear warfare doctrine which was based on “attack and 
evade” principles and which rejected static deployments. The concept 
required units to come together temporarily to attack the enemy 
and then to rapidly disperse to avoid becoming a nuclear target. 
Rowley, however, believed that what the doctrine manual called 
“stabilize, contain and delineate” the enemy ultimately meant “stop.” 
He pointed out that there had in fact been increased stress on digging 
in, prepared rifle positions, the cover of obstacles by fire and the 
occupation of ground. The report found that approved doctrine 
was not consistent with what was practised in training, called for 
in operational plans or with weapons and equipment. The division 
28  Army Tactics and Organization Board, Coordinating Conference No. 1, Digest of 
Presentation – Infantry/Tank Relationship, 19 March 1963, RG 80/234, DHH.
29  MGen. J.P.E. Bernatchez, VCGS to Distribution List [ATOB, Canadian Army 
Staff College and principal CFHQ army staff], Future Activities, Army Tactics 
and Organization Board, 28 November 1963, RG 24, Vol. 18835, LAC; and Army 
Combat Development and Tactical Doctrine Committee, Minutes of 63/4 Meeting, 
10 December 1963, RG 81/272, DHH.
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proposed by Rowley would ideally be based on all arms battalions, 
but under the constraints placed on the study would have to be based 
on infantry and armour formations. The armour regiment, however, 
would include almost double the number of tanks, the establishment 
being raised from forty-seven to seventy-eight. Current anti-tank 
missiles were not seen as much of a solution to the Warsaw Pact tank 
hordes as they had a lower rate of fire and no better accuracy than 
a tank gun while having less protection and being more expensive. 
Rowley recommended that if more anti-tank forces were required they 
should be supplied with more tanks. Infantry was to be mounted on 
APCs, but the Final Report recommended more trials be conducted 
before crews and tactics were decided.30
The Final Report was constrained by manpower limits from 
strengthening close support and air defence artillery to the extent it 
regarded as necessary. Field engineers, aviation and logistic elements 
all required improvements beyond that which could be provided 
within the limits placed on the division. The problems surfaced by 
ATOB’s analysis were never resolved as operational requirements 
cancelled further tank and infantry trials and the Army’s studies 
were overtaken by parallel projects aimed at designing the “mobile 
force” desired by Minister Paul Hellyer. Rowley and the ATOB would 
spend the next year working on a study of the Army’s reconnaissance 
needs, but while a detailed report was completed, little else was 
accomplished. Rowley’s preface in his 1965 report on ATOB’s 
disbandment complained of “frustration” and commented that:
ATOB then has had unique opportunities to study fundamental problems 
of military organization on Canadian military activities. Unfortunately, 
they did not, as ATOB’s work always seemed to be out of place with 
the actual reorganization being carried out in the Canadian Army and, 
in the event, the proposed division was never formed.31
Rowley was correct. Walsh had gone to the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
for approval in principle to reorganise the Army in March 1963, 
months before the Final Report had been completed. By the time 
he was able to go the Minister in May 1964, the task was to make 
the Army fit the overall needs of the Hellyer White Paper. Although 
30  ATOB Final Report, 60-68, 96-100.
31  ATOB Report on 1965 Activities, n.d., RG 24, Vol. 18835, LAC.
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Walsh was able to take some steps to reorganise, in September 
1964 Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, the chief of the defence staff, 
deferred any more changes to the Army until there was an integrated 
defence program to guide the Forces as a whole.32
The ATOB was the high point of the Army’s ability to solve 
tactical problems and design a future force. It combined multiple 
methodologies and followed a process that utilised staff opinion 
rather than overriding it. Yet rational analysis had met its limit. 
Even progressives such as Walsh and Bernatchez would not consider 
a radical change to the organisation of the combat arms. And while 
the Army itself had abandoned top-down policy development, the 
political level had not. Hellyer’s mobile force initiative replicated 
Simonds and Graham’s approach by beginning with the answer and 
asking staff to fill in the details. Fact-based decision making had its 
limits even among the various schools of progressives.
swan song – the officer development board
The report of the Officer Development Board (ODB), tabled in 1969, 
is the work for which Rowley is best remembered and is arguably 
his greatest contribution to the Canadian military profession. Like 
his other projects, it failed to gain much acceptance at the time. 
Its recommendations would languish for over thirty years before 
implementation.
The armed services had traditionally not seen education as the 
most important quality of officership, favouring character instead. 
In its final report the ODB would note that about 60 per cent of 
candidates accepted into the officer corps each year had less than a 
university degree and a majority only had junior matriculation (Grade 
10).33 By the 1960s, opinion in the Army was divided: traditionalists 
32  LGen. G. Walsh, CGS, to Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, Canadian Divisional 
Reorganization, 1 March 1963; LGen. G. Walsh to the Minister, Organization of 
the Filed Force, White Paper on Defence, 7 May 1964; and ACM Frank Miller, 
CDS to COpR [MGen. J. Allard], Organization of the Field Force, Royal Canadian 
Engineers, 29 September 1964, all in RG 1223, Ser 1, File 361, DHH.
33  “Report of the Officer Development Board: Volume I (including Annexes),” in 
The Report of the Officer Development Board, ed. Wakelam and Coombs, 66. This 
facsimile of Volume I of the ODB report is the most accessible source and will be 
cited in lieu of archival sources.  The report can also be found at RG 82/140, DHH. 
Hereafter cited as ODB Report.
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continued to stress personal character and field experience, but 
progressives saw a need to improve the intellectual level of the Army 
and improve its standing in the wider community. Air Chief Marshal 
Frank Miller, the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and 
shortly to be named the first chief of the defence staff (CDS), directed 
the inter-service Personnel Members Committee (PMC) to initiate a 
study to develop a rationale for the services’ need for officers with 
university degrees. Miller was apparently motivated by the Glassco 
Commission’s criticism of the services’ ability to manage a modern 
military organisation.34
The PMC not only concluded that the command of nuclear-armed 
forces based on increasingly sophisticated technology demanded 
higher education levels, but also that the armed forces were becoming 
an unattractive employer to the most intellectually capable portion of 
the population. The PMC estimated that the army and navy required 
two-thirds of their officers to be degree holders while the air force 
required about half of its officers to complete university.35
Jean Allard inherited the file when he took over as chief of the 
defence staff from Miller. He faced the added difficulties of trying 
to determine what officership in a unified armed service meant and 
how to unify the former services’ officer development programs into 
a coherent whole. Allard circulated a development plan of his own 
to key staff and, based on the responses he received, decided that a 
full-time study group under a senior officer was required to address 
the issues involved.36 Allard turned to Rowley, then on his terminal 
posting approaching compulsory retirement age, to lead the study. 
The mandate he gave to Rowley was:
To examine all phases of the regular officer profession from selection 
and initial training to the highest levels, with a view of producing an 
Officer Development Plan designed to ensure maximum efficiency and 
34  Armed Forces Sub-Committee on Pay and Allowances, Submission to the 
Personnel Members Committee, Service Requirements for University Graduates, 15 
July 1964, Larry Motiuk Papers, Canadian Forces College, Toronto.  Hereafter cited 
as Motiuk Papers, CFC.
35  Armed Forces Sub-Committee on Pay and Allowances, Submission to the 
Personnel Members Committee, Service Requirements for University Graduates, 15 
July 1964, Motiuk Papers, CFC. 
36  Gen. J.V. Allard, Officer Development Plan, 25 May 1967, Motiuk Papers, 
CFC.  While Allard’s cover letter has survived, a copy of the outline plan could 
not be located.
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economy of resources in the selection, training and education of the 
officer corps required to command and administer the Armed Forces.37
Rowley approached the problem in an expansive manner. He told 
the RMC Faculty Board that “[n]o Canadian [had] ever waxed 
philosophical about the Canadian Armed Forces” but that he “would 
be developing a rationale, then a philosophy, for the profession of 
arms in Canada.”38 He would start by looking at the rationale for 
standing forces in Canada and the requirements of the profession of 
arms before going on to look at education levels, attrition rates, the 
development program for officers throughout their career and the 
organisation of the officer development system. As at the ATOB, 
Rowley would allow his team to work and develop concepts within 
the framework he had established but without constraints based on 
his personal views.39
The Board’s work on a concept of military professionalism began 
with a paper written by Brigadier B.J. Guimond, the deputy chairman. 
Guimond outlined Canada’s military history and concluded that 
although Canada’s militia tradition had been successful in generating 
large forces during the two world wars, it had failed to develop the 
military profession. Officers “remained an appendage rather than an 
integral part of society. Admired on memorial days, [they were] soon 
relegated to the cloister of [their] garrison which many a Canadian 
considered little more than a British enclave totally unrelated to 
his society.” This perception, according to Guimond, was deserved. 
Trained in the British military tradition, its history and imperial 
geopolitics, the Canadian officer had failed to fit into the intellectual 
and professional pattern of Canadian life. Colonialism had another 
negative effect on the Canadian military profession. Despite Canada’s 
great material contributions during the two world wars, Canadian 
military officials had little or no access to decision making at the 
theatre level or to grand strategy.40
37  ODB Report, 5.
38  Royal Military College Faculty Board, 152nd Meeting, 28 November 1967, in 
author’s possession.
39  Randall Wakelam, “Officer Professional Education in the Canadian Forces and 
the Rowley Report, 1969,” Historical Studies in Education/Revue d’histoire de 
l’éducation 16, 2 (2004): 297.
40  Brig. B.J. Guimond, The Rationale for the Officer Development Study, 28 
December 1967, Motiuk Papers, CFC.
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Canada’s foreign and defence policy required a reversal of 
traditional ways. The NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation meant 
that Canada now had to maintain forces-in-being which were highly 
trained and capable of immediate response. Moreover, while many of 
Canada’s policy goals could be pursued from within the structure of 
alliances, there had been a “gradual metamorphosis” into autonomous 
or semi-autonomous forces which could act as peacekeeping or 
intervention forces to prevent great power confrontations. Officers not 
only had to be able to manage such forces in operations, but they had 
to be capable of devising strategy and “be prepared to think in terms 
of our national interests where they do not coincide with, or bear little 
relation to, those of our allies.” Within twenty years, Guimond could 
see the resolution of the “German problem” and the relaxation of 
tension between the two blocks to the point where an active military 
role in Europe would lose its validity.41 
Guimond’s paper served as a platform for discussion within the 
Board and much of his thinking was reflected in the ODB’s final 
report. It adopted his concern that colonialism had had adverse effects 
on the Canadian military profession. The ODB final report stated:
It is a measure of the total absence of significant dialogue between 
the military and political elements of the country that while the 
officer, through his initial development and subsequent training, was, 
consciously or not, following a policy of Imperial centralization, his 
political masters were opposing this same policy. … 
Gradually we find the professional Canadian officer isolating himself 
from his own society and viewing his military role in terms of Imperial 
defence and strategy, with little or no concern for the study of the 
strategic problems likely to face his own country. … [T]his Canadian 
officer had no conception of the strategic implications of Canada being 
at once an Atlantic and a Pacific power, or of the fact that his country’s 
vital interests could quite possibly be deeply affected by policies 
developed to the south, including the far reaches of the South American 
continent, rather than in the protection of Singapore, Hong Kong or 
Gibraltar.
41  Guimond, The Rationale for the Officer Development Study, CFC. Guimond’s 
hypothesis was correct.  He wrote in 1967 and the Berlin Wall came down in 1989.
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It is astonishing to realize that despite its geographical position, and 
the absence of any immediate military threat, Canada could afford to 
live without a realistic strategy, and indeed without strategists; but the 
fact remains.42
Echoing Guimond’s paper, the final report argued that “Canada 
supplied troops and material for war machines to be planned, 
organized and commanded from elsewhere.”43
The ODB final report laid less emphasis than Guimond on the 
Canadian Forces as an independent intervention force and stressed 
the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and 
NATO alliance commitments, commenting that it was unlikely that 
commitments to the United Nations (UN) for major forces would 
increase. Nevertheless, the final report envisaged much the same 
forces as Guimond had, namely balanced, strategically mobile land, 
sea and air forces. Forces that would be able to “survive and make a 
viable contribution” under conditions of tactical nuclear warfare and 
forces that would employ modern weapon systems and computer-
assisted command and control. Officers in this high-tech force would 
have to be capable of managing across the continuum of combat 
intensity and across military environments. The requirements for 
managing this force would be not only technical education, but an 
increased understanding of the social sciences and the liberal arts.44
Given the Board’s assessment of the armed forces Canada 
would maintain in the future, it is not surprising that they strongly 
supported a military profession based on expertise. They quoted the 
Prussian edict of 1808:
The only title to an officer’s commission shall be, in time of peace, 
education and professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished 
valour and perception. From the entire nation, therefore, all individuals 
who possess these qualities are eligible for the highest military posts. 
All previously existing class preference in the military establishment 
is abolished, and every man, without regard to his origins, has equal 
duties and equal rights.45
42  ODB Report, 22-23.
43  ODB Report, 23.
44  ODB Report., 31-33.
45  ODB Report, 18-19.
22
Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/7
  23K A S U R A K 
Rather hopefully, the Board noted that under this policy “a new 
military aristocracy of education and achievement emerged.” Corporate 
spirit would knit the officer corps into a professional community which 
would become in turn a highly respected social entity.46
A second major principle adopted by Rowley’s group was the 
rejection of Samuel Huntington’s definition of the military profession 
as “managers of violence.” This concept places the combat arms at 
the centre of the profession and renders supporting specialists, such 
as logisticians, second-class citizens.47 The Board stated that, while 
this definition may have worked in the simpler past, “the enormous 
complexity of the modern military function makes a simple definition 
of this nature irrelevant and renders comparison on a function basis 
with other professions artificial and limiting.”48 Rowley adopted a 
“big tent” view of the profession. No military branches or occupations 
were “core” with the others peripheral. Moreover, the officer corps 
was expected to contain soldier-diplomats to manage peacekeeping 
and alliance operations and soldier-scholars to carry out research to 
expand the body of knowledge of the military profession. Rowley and 
the Board expected that a great deal of research should be undertaken 
in the area of national security studies by the military itself and that 
it should lead to the award of Master of Military Science degrees to 
serving officers.49
The final report also contained a statement of “the canons of 
the military ethic.” This was a short list of responsibilities about 
one page in length. While all of the soldierly virtues it contained 
were traditional, there was no reference to the inevitability of war 
or implication that war was an acceptable ingredient of a nation’s 
foreign policy. This explicitly tied the military ethic to a liberal, rather 
than a conservative, realist philosophy. The statement was otherwise 
unexceptional, listing the duty of upholding constitutional authority, 
loyalty to the service, respect to other members of the profession, care 
of subordinates and unlimited liability to carry out duties. However, 
perhaps with a view to the recent “revolt of the admirals,” it also 
46  ODB Report, 18-19.
47  Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 12.
48  ODB Report, 18.
49  ODB Report, 32, 47.
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contained the duty to “maintain and respect the legally constituted 
hierarchy of the Armed Forces.”50
The core elements of the report were radical. The British colonial 
heritage of the armed forces was criticised as having limited the 
development of a truly Canadian military. Officership based on 
expertise was proposed for the officer corps and the expectations 
placed on officers expanded dramatically to include commanding 
elements of all the services, actively contributing to the development 
of national security policy and strategy and being scholars engaged in 
expanding the knowledge of their profession. None of these demands 
drew much fire individually; what became lightning rods for criticism 
were the degreed officer corps and the centralisation of the officer 
development system proposed by Rowley’s report.
Rowley found considerable opposition to a degreed officer corps 
amongst his senior Canadian Forces colleagues. The commandant 
of the Staff College, Brigadier-General W.A. Milroy told him that 
education was not the same as military leadership, or even the main 
component of it. A member of the College directing staff summed 
up by saying “the degree requirement [was] far too restrictive for the 
type of fighting leader we need.” Major-General Bruce Macdonald, 
the deputy chief of personnel, and Vice-Admiral R.L. Hennessy, the 
Comptroller General, both thought insisting on a degree would increase 
attrition in the “great variety of officer positions which do not now, 
and never will, require a university education.” Brigadier-General 
S. Mathwin Davin, the director general of systems management in 
Canadian Forces Headquarters and soon-to-be commandant of the 
National Defence College, claimed “a Bachelor’s degree for a hired 
killer – even if we call him a ‘peace keeper’ etc. may well turn out to 
be a handicap.”51
These comments gave Rowley pause and he asked his team 
to consider whether they had been too uncompromising regarding 
a degreed officer corps, but he did not ultimately overrule them. 
The ODB final report justified a bachelor’s degree as the baseline 
50  ODB Report, 36-37.
51  MGen. R. Rowley, Report of Visit to CASC, 7-9 Feb 68, 16 February 1968, 
Annex B, Second Meeting, 8 February 1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC; VAdm. R.L. 
Hennessy to DPRC, Degree Requirements – Canadian Armed Forces, 20 February 
1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC; MGen. Bruce F. Macdonald to DPRC, Baccalaureate 
Degrees, 27 February 1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC; and BGen. S. Mathwin Davis to 
DPRC, Baccalaureate Degrees, 19 February 1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC.
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requirement for officership primarily on the requirement to be able to 
recruit from the intellectually top 15 per cent of the male population. 
This group was attending university in ever greater numbers and 
the Board believed the non-university pool of promising candidates 
would soon be too small to meet the Forces’ needs. They also 
believed that with technology becoming increasingly sophisticated 
and demands of advising the government on geopolitics becoming 
more complex that “it [was] inconceivable that the future defence of 
the nation should be entrusted to officers who are not both literate 
and scientifically literate.”52
The second major issue which stood between the Board’s report 
and implementation was the architecture of the officer development 
system. The Board proposed a single authority, the Canadian Defence 
Education Centre (CDEC), to manage the entire system. There 
would be two colleges under it: the Canadian Defence College offering 
in-service education to commissioned officers and the Canadian 
Military College providing undergraduate and graduate education. 
CDEC would be in Ottawa at the Rockcliffe base and would not only 
provide its courses from that location but would also include a library 
and wargaming facility. Ottawa would also be home to a National 
Security Course offered by a pan-governmental Centre for Security 
Studies. This would provide strategic studies components of CDEC 
courses as well as be a government “think tank.”53 
Richard Preston, in his history of the Royal Military College, 
blames the failure of the Department of National Defence to 
implement the ODB Report on what he saw as Rowley’s attempt 
to recommend an ideal system without regard to the cost.54 Yet it 
appears that Preston’s explanation is too simple. Rowley—along 
with Allard and Léo Cadieux, the defence minister—recognised 
that full implementation of the Board’s report was too expensive 
to be accomplished all at once and a phased approach would be 
needed. Randall Wakelam has pointed to the number of sacred cows 
implementation would have harmed. Placing a two-star commander 
between the various existing colleges and the CDS would have 
52  ODB Report, 38-41.
53  Wakelam, “Officer Professional Education in the Canadian Forces,” 287-314 
provides the best overview of the structural proposals and their inherent problems.
54  Richard Preston, To Serve Canada: A History of the Royal Military College Since 
the Second World War (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991), 100-01.
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downgraded the existing institutions. The mix of civil and military 
governance for both academics and officer education was radical and 
likely unacceptable to many in both communities. The centralisation 
of all the military colleges to Ottawa would have been difficult for 
incumbent faculty members to accept and would have raised questions 
regarding seniority and family relocation.55 
The ODB recommendations melted away like a snowball left on 
a hot radiator. The replacement of Rowley with the Commandant 
of the Canadian Army Staff College, Major-General Milroy, put 
an officer in charge of implementing a report who had doubted its 
fundamental premises. With the Forces downsizing, Milroy advocated 
“a new, more modest plan.” The gaming facility and strategic studies 
centre were dropped as too costly as was the school for upgrading 
candidates to university entrance level. Cadieux approved a stage 
one of centralising post-commissioning development at Canadian 
Forces Base Rockcliffe with a second phase of moving the military 
colleges to that site along with post-graduate education, but no action 
was ever taken.56 According to Milroy’s later recollection, he elected 
not to implement the centralised model proposed by Rowley based 
on his own appreciation of Ottawa realpolitik. He instead set up 
a Canadian Defence Education Establishments organisation which 
preserved the three military colleges. Cadieux apparently improved 
Milroy’s “understanding” of the political value of three colleges for 
regional visibility and cadet recruiting. There were also those outside 
the department who cautioned that centralising military education 
and creating a strategic studies centre in Ottawa might smack of 
an attempt to create a “military-industrial complex” and a centre 
which would have a disproportionate effect on influencing government 
policy.57 In the end, not even Milroy’s Canadian Defence Education 
Establishments survived. By 1972, the presence of academic education 
in National Defence Headquarters had been reduced to that of a staff 
colonel within the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) Branch.58 
55  Wakelam, “Officer Professional Education in the Canadian Forces,” 306-08.
56  Defence Council – Minute of 271st Meeting – 25 August 1969; and Defence 
Council – Minute of 272nd Meeting – 4 September 1969, RG 73/1223, Box 68, File 
1394, DHH.
57  Dr. J.A. Corry [former Principal of Queen’s University] to Major-General R. 
Rowley, 16 December 1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC.
58  Wakelam, “Officer Professional Education in the Canadian Forces,” 307-10; and 
Corry to Rowley, 16 December 1968, Motiuk Papers, CFC.
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 In his forward to the ODB Report, General Allard concluded 
with the comment that:
It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower 
strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them; without 
a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the 
Forces would, in the future, be doomed to, at the best, mediocrity; at 
the worst, disaster.59
Allard’s fears materialised in the collapse of discipline in stabilisation 
missions in Croatia and Somalia in the early 1990s. The Somalia 
incident, centred on the death of a Somali prisoner in custody, led to 
a public inquiry which became so controversial that defence minister 
of the day, Douglas Young, terminated it. To shape the government’s 
response to the inquiry, he appointed four prominent academics to 
make recommendations. While Young’s academic advisors did not 
agree as to how the army should be restructured, they did agree that 
the officer corps was undereducated and out of touch with Canadian 
society. Jack Granatstein summed it up by commenting that the 
officer corps was “remarkably ill-educated…surely one of the worst 
in the Western world.”60 A major focus of the reforms initiated by 
Young included a curriculum for RMC placing greater emphasis on 
the arts and social sciences, introducing national security studies 
and strategic studies to the Canadian Forces College and requiring 
officers to hold a baccalaureate degree. By 2009, the goal of a degreed 
officer corps had been substantially attained.61
Rowley’s structural reforms from 1969 were also accepted at about 
the same time. A Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was established 
in 2002 that had one academic college (RMC) and one professional 
college (Canadian Forces College) under it. The CDA is the Forces’ 
champion for lifelong learning. It is not, however, concentrated on one 
campus in Ottawa.
59  ODB Report, 4.
60  J.L. Granatstein, “A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence,” 25 
March 1997, RG 96/30, Series 9, Box 11, Files 21-4, Claude Beauregard fonds, DHH. 
61  Kasurak, A National Force, 272-74.
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conclusion – the importance of failed reform
The world loves successful commanders—but why should we care 
about a failed one? To answer this question, one must understand how 
the model of military professionalism defined by Rowley’s initiatives 
was based on knowledge and represented the progressive wing of 
the profession. The opposing, traditional model was an officership 
based on character, rather than knowledge. It was not interested in 
dealing with strategic or political issues and was content to have 
its strategic architecture designed and delivered by Great Power 
allies. The leadership style of the traditional school was, as Horn 
and Bentley have pointed out, hierarchical and authoritarian.
Rowley diverged from these characteristics on almost every point. 
He was a champion of officership based on knowledge, during both his 
tenure as commandant of the Canadian Army Staff College, where he 
expanded the curriculum and tried to nurture soldier-scholars, and 
later as the chair of the Officer Development Board, where he endorsed 
a degreed officer corps. Knowledge-based solutions—like merging the 
armour and infantry corps—were to be tested, not rejected out of 
hand. Moreover, his vision of the profession extended beyond that of 
tactical technician to participation in national policy and strategy. 
The ODB recommendation of an interdepartmental strategic studies 
centre in Ottawa would have created an institution that could have 
both bridged the gap between the military and the political level and 
generated a Canadian national strategic point of view.
Rowley’s version of the military profession was hierarchical 
but not autocratic. As the commandant of the Army Tactics and 
Organization Board he was not afraid to make decisions after a full 
and free discussion of options with his staff. These discussions were 
collegial and not driven by a top-down solution in search of staff 
substantiation. In the case of the ODB, Rowley did not overrule staff 
on the recommendation of a degreed officer corps, even though he 
had some personal reservations and the knowledge that many of his 
senior colleagues were opposed to the idea. Rowley’s way of doing 
business was more inclusive and professional than that of most of his 
senior colleagues.
However, rather than a knowledge-based profession that meshed 
with the political leadership of the country and which was able to 
develop and utilise the talent of all levels of the profession, the Canadian 
Army and the Canadian Armed Forces pursued a traditional path. 
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The period that followed was marked by continuing divergence of the 
Canadian Forces and the political level, with the Forces “working” 
less with the political level and more often “shirking” and pursuing 
their own agenda, notably the preservation of heavy forces on NATO’s 
Central Front.62 The perception by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
and Defence Minister Donald Macdonald that the army was shirking 
led directly to the Management Review Group and the replacement 
of Canadian Forces Headquarters by a civilian-dominated National 
Defence Headquarters.
Rather than increasing its education level and becoming more 
conversant and comfortable with civilian management technologies 
and civilian society in general, the Canadian Forces descended 
into what one observer has called a state of “moral panic” over a 
perceived imposition of incompatible civilian values on the military. 
This led to decades of resistance to the expansion of legislatively 
and constitutionally guaranteed rights and the inclusion of women, 
minorities and members of the LGBTQ2 community in the military.63 
In the opinion of Horn and Bentley, “many of the senior leadership fell 
back on their underlying culture, namely secrecy and stone-walling 
outside criticism.”64
This top-down hierarchical approach drove army planning during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Its System Study, aimed at redesigning the army 
to reflect perceived requirements, started with a solution dictated 
before any study was done—that infantry would be the primary arm 
that the others would serve. It was also premised on the assumption 
that Canada would field an entire army corps when it struggled to 
project even a single brigade during much of the period. The army’s 
indulgence in magical thinking ended only in 1994 when the colonels 
collectively revolted at the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board and 
refused to write a full set of doctrinal publications to support it.65
62  Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  Feaver argues for an agency 
theory of civil-military relations in which the military agent works for the civilian 
principal.  When an agent follows the principal’s direction they are said to be 
“working,” when they refuse or avoid following direction they are “shirking.”
63  Stephan D. Flemming, “The Civilianization Theory of Civil-Military Relations: 
They Have Met the Enemy and He is Us” (MA Thesis, Carleton University, 
1989), 45-47.
64  Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 76.
65  Kasurak, A National Force, 214.
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The failure to pursue the model of professionalism represented by 
Rowley led to professional failure and then collapse in Somalia.66 While 
it might be too bold to state that if Rowley’s collective reforms had 
been implemented, Somalia might have been avoided, its possibility 
would have been materially reduced. In addition, the government and 
the Canadian Forces’ own reactions to Somalia recognised at least the 
degreed officer corps and the need to develop higher level strategic 
thinking in the officer corps. Understanding why Rowley failed and 
the cost of failure is perhaps more important than understanding 
successful reforms that have been accomplished since.
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